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(A)

STATEMENT OF TWE CASE

THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a non-acute lumbar spine occupational disease claim that went before the

Industrial Commission on the Claimant's Motion For Emergency Hearing on 12.19.08. The
Claimant presented uncontroverted factual evidence that his Sawyer / Assembler job exposed
him to the characteristic and peculiar hazards of repetitive heavy lifting, bending and twisting.
The Defendants conceded that the Claimant was exposed to these hazards and the Industrial
Commission found that he was exposed to these hazards.
The Claimant presented unrebutted medical opinion evidence which proved that his
industrial exposure to the hazards of his Sawyer / Assembler job caused his non-acute lumbar
spine occupational disease. The Defendants conceded that Claimant had met his burden of
proof. The Defendants did

disclose 1 adverse fact or 1 adverse medical opinion prior to the

12.19.08 hearing to rebut the Claimant's proof and did not call 1 witness at the hearing.
After the 12.19.08 Emergency Hearing, the Defendants took the post-hearing deposition
of their IME medical expert. During his post-hearing deposition, the Defendants' IME medical
expert created, developed or manufactured 14 new medical opinions that the Defendants did not
disclose prior to hearine, The Industrial Commission relied on these 14 new surprise posthearing medical opinions when it ruled that the Claimant 'Tailed to prove that his need for

surgery is the result of an occupational disease arising out of and in the course of his
employment" (R., p. 96, 115, L1. 10-11). The Commission abandoned the principle of stare
decisis and departed from its prior ruling without good cause in order to reach this conclusion.

Claimant 1Appellant's Opening Brief

Page 7

The Industrial Commission misapplied the

els son'

defense to deny this claim even

though the Commission did not list the Nelson defense in its notice of hearing, the Defendants
waived the Nelson defense on the record at the hearing and the Commission improperly shifted
the burden of disproving the Nelson defense to the Claimant. The Industrial Commission
misstated the evidence in the record, failed to follow closely analogous precedent and misapplied
this Court's "characteristic of and peculiar to" standards in order to find that the hazards of the
Claimant's job did not distinguish it from the general m of occupations.
(B)

THE COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
The Claimant filed a Motion For Emergency Hearing on 8.5.08 and requested medical

benefits, temporary disability benefits and attorney's fees (R., pp. 11-70). The Industrial
Commission held an Emergency Hearing on 12.19.08 (Tr., pp. 1-68). After the Emergency
Hearing, the Defendants took the post-hearing deposition of the Defendants' IME medical
expert, Michael S. Weiss, M.D. on 1.27.09 (R., pp. 84-87). The Industrial Commission denied
this claim on 6.8.09 and found that the Claimant failed to prove that the need for his lumbar
surgery was the result of an occupational disease arising out of and in the course of his
employment (R., pp. 88-99). The Claimant filed a Motion for Correction of Erratum and Motion
for Reconsideration of 6.8.09 Decision with supporting Brief on 6.26.09 (R., pp. 100-148). The
Claimant filed his Motion To Strike Undisclosed Medical Opinions of IME physician Michael S.

'

Nelson v. Ponsness-Warren Idgas Enter.,126 Idaho 129,879 P.2d 592 (1994) (the Nelson defense bars recovery where the
Claimant is seeking compensation for the aggravation of a preexisting condition but the aggravation is not caused by a new
accident)
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Weiss, M.D. on 7.8.09 (R., pp. 152-159). The Industrial Commission denied the Claimant's posthearing Motions on 10.14.09 and affirmed its prior 6.8.09 denial of this claim (R., pp. 170-178).
The Claimant filed his Notice of Appeal on 11.24.09 (R., pp. 179-188).
(C)

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The Claimant started working for Joslin on 9.13.05 when he was 28 (DOB: 1.2.77) (Tr.,

p. 12, Ll. 3-4; p. 15, L1. 8-10). From birth to 9.13.05, the Claimant did not suffer any injury to
his low back caused by an accident and was

afflicted with a low back occupational disease

that had manifested itself prior to his date of hire on 9.13.05 (Tr., p. 13, L1. 13-19; p. 14, LI. 1020; p. 15, LI. 13-23; p. 17, L1. 23 - 25; and p. 18, Ll. 1-5). After going to work for Joslin on
9.13.05, the Claimant was not involved in any new accidents that caused injury to his low back
(Ex. 4, Bates No. 004010-00401 1; Ex. 5, Bates No. 005004; Ex. 6, Bates No. 006001; Ex. 7,
Bates No. 007001 and Ex. 8, Bates No. 008001).
Three months after going to work for Joslin, the Claimant visited a chiropractor twice
complaining of low back pain that came on spontaneously without an accident or injuv (R., p.
94, I l l , L1. 8-9) (Ex. 13, Bates No. 013003). The Claimant's low back pain was localized only
to the region of his low back and did not radiate down his left buttock and left leg (Tr., p. 19, L1.
6-9) (Ex. 13, Bates No. 013001-013005).
Dr. Meissner took an X-ray of the Claimant's low back on 12.13.05 which he interpreted

as "negativefor pathology" (Ex. 13, Bates No. 013003) and told the Claimant that "there was
nothing to tellJ' about the results of the X-ray because "there was nothing wrong" with the
Claimant's low back (Tr., p. 20, L1. 2-5). Dr. Meissner released the Claimant to return to full
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duty work without any permanent physical impairment rating or restrictions effective 12.16.05
(Ex. 13, Bates No. 013005).
The Claimant changed jobs to Sawyer 1 Assembler in mid-2006 (Tr., p. 21, L. 24 - p. 22,
L. 1). This job exposed the Claimant to the hazards of repetitive heavy lifting, t w M g and
bending while in awkward positions in a confined space at the fast pace of the production
cycle (Ex. 3, Bates No. 003001) (Tr., p. 22 - p. 33).

The Defendants conceded that the Claimant was exposed to these hazards and the
Commissionfound that the Claimant was exposed to these hazards (R., p. 94,111, L. 14 - p. 95,
L. 2; p. 96,114, L1. 3-4). After being exposed to the hazards of the Sawyer / Assembler job for
approximately 18 months, the Claimant developed a sharp, cramping like sensation in his lower
left back which radiated down into his left buttock and left leg to the back of his left knee in

November of 2007 (Tr., p. 36, L1. 14-16). The Claimant had never experienced any left buttock
or left leg-cramping sensations prior to November of 2007 (Tr., p. 42, L1. 13-19) (Ex. 5, Bates
No. 005004).
The Claimant underwent a lumbar spine MRI on 1.23.08 which confirmed that the
Claimant's L1-2, L2-3 and L3-4 disc levels were all normal, but the Claimant had developed
advanced degenerative disc disease at L5-S1 which included a very large left paracentral disc
herniation with extruded fvagment that was displacing the Claimant's left S1 traversing nerve

root (Ex. 9, Bates No. 009001-009002). Based on the results of the Claimant's 1.23.08 MRI, the
Claimant's neurological surgeon, R. Tyler Frizzell, M.D. recommended that the Claimant
undergo an L5-S1 microdiskectomy surgery (Tr., p. 48, L1.2-5).

Claimant 1 Appellant's Opening Brief

On 4.29.08, the Claimant provided Dr. Frizzell with a copy of his writtenjob description
and asked him to issue a narrative report that addressed all of the elements in the prima facie case
(PFC) for an occupational disease claim (R., pp. 30-33) (Ex. 8, Bates No. 008010-008013). On
5.5.08, Dr. Frizzell issued a written report that addressed all of the elements in the PFC and
plainly and unequivocally expressed his conviction that the Claimant was suffering from a
lumbar spine occupational disease that he had contracted 1 incurred as the result of his exposure
to the hazards of repetitive heavy lifting, twisting and bending that were characteristic of and
peculiar to his job as a Sawyer 1 Assembler (R., pp. 24-25) (Ex. 8, Bates No. 008039-008040).
The Claimant served Defendants with copy of Dr. Frizzell's 5.5.08 PFC letter on 5.8.08
and requested authorization for surgery and the payment of temporary disability benefits (R., pp.
21-22) (Ex. 10, Bates No. 010001-010045). After receiving notice of the manifestation of the
Claimant's lumbar spine occupational disease, the Defendants requested the Claimant to give a
recorded statement to their investigator. During his 5.16.08 recorded statement, the Claimant
confirmed that he did

not participate in any physical

activities outside of work which could

expose him to hazards that could be implicated in the cause of his lumbar spine degenerative
disease (Ex. 4, Bates No. 004019 - 004021).
After making 3 requests for surgery authorization between 5.8.08 and 6.11.08, the
Claimant filed a Complaint with the Industrial Commission and served Defendants with his
discovery requests on 6.1 1.08 (R., pp. 1-7). The Claimant's contention interrogatories required
the Defendants to disclose each and every fact which supported each denial in their Answer and
each affirmative defense they intended to assert against any element in the PFC for an

Claimant 1 Appellant's Opening Brief

occupational disease claim. The Defendants did a t disclose 1 fact in their 7.8.08 answers to
interrogatories which supported any of the denials or contentions in their Answer and did not
disclose 1 fact that would give rise to an affirmative defense to any element in the PFC for an
occupational disease claim (Ex. 12, Bates No. 012001-012014).
Claimant's interrogatory 5 required the Defendants to make a11 pre-hear in^ expert
witness disclosures required by I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4).

The Defendants' 7.8.08 answer to

interrogatory 5 did not make any of the expert witness disclosures required by I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)
(Ex. 12, Bates No. 012003-012005). On 10.10.08, the Defendants supplemented their answer to
interrogatory 5 by serving Claimant with a copy Defense IME medical expert, Michael S. Weiss,
M.D.'s 10.1.08 IME report (R., p. 80).
In their 10.1.08 IME engagement letter to Dr. Weiss, the Defendants asked Dr. Weiss to
answer 1 medical causation question (Ex. 14, Bates No. 014003). Dr. Weiss did not answer the 1
medical causation question posed to him by the Defendants and did not render any adverse
medical opinions that addressed any element in the PFC for an occupational disease claim. Dr.
Weiss merely stated the following:
(1)

(2)
(3)

(4)

It is within the standard of community practice for the Claimant to have
the back surgery recommended by Dr. Frizzell (case specific opinion);
Back pain and spinal arthritis are common in the general population
(generic observation);
Heavy work is called exercise and exercise is generally thought to be
beneficial (generic observation); and,
Sedentary workers have high rates of back pain complaint and disability
(generic observation) (Ex. 14, Bates No. 014009).

The Defendants' 10.10.08supplemental answers are not part of Ex. 12 but merely referred the Claimant to Dr. Weiss' lo. 1.08
IME report.
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Dr. Weiss admitted under oath during his 1.27.09 post-hearing deposition that he did
review the Claimant's written job description before conducting his 10.1.08 IME examination
(Dep., p. 34, L1. 15-22), he did not ask the Claimant a single question about his work activities
during the 10.1.08 IME examination (Dep., p. 46, L. 25 - p. 47, L. 3), and he did

review the

Claimant's hearing testimony describing his work activities before he gave his post-hearing
medical opinions (Dep., p. 34, L1. 6-14). The Claimant gave uncontroverted testimony
confirming that Dr. Weiss did

not ask the

Claimant a single question about his Sawyer I

Assembler job during the 10.1.08 IME examination (Tr., p. 51, L1. 10-12).
The Claimant forwarded Dr. Weiss' 10.1.08 IME report to his attending physicians and
asked them to issue rebuttal reports. Dr. Frizzell issued a supplemental report on 10.30.08 which

again addressed each element in the PFC for a compensable occupational disease claim and
again reiterated his conviction that the Claimant was suffering from a lumbar spine occupational
disease that he had contracted I incurred as the result of his exposure to hazards that were
characteristic of and peculiar to his job as a Sawyer 1 Assembler for Joslin Millwork (Ex. 8,
Bates No. 008041-008042).
Physiatrist, James H. Bates, M.D., reviewed Dr. Frizzell's original 5.5.08 PFC report, Dr.
Weiss' 10.1.08 IME report, Dr. Frizzell's 10.30.08 supplemental report and the Claimant's
written job description and then issued his 12.4.08 report which plainly and unequivocally
expressed his conviction that the Claimant was suffering from a lumbar spine back injury or
occupational disease that he had contracted I incurred as the result of his exposure to hazards that
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were characteristic of and peculiar to his job as a Sawyer / Assembler for Joslin Millwork (Ex. 7,
Bates No. 0070 16-007017).
The Claimant was the only witness to testify at the 12.19.08 Emergency Hearing (Tr., p.

,

11 - p. 66). After the 12.19.08 Emergency Hearing, the Defendants deposed their IME expert,
Michael S. Weiss, M.D. on 1.27.09 (R., pp. 84-87). During his 1.27.09 post-hearing deposition,
Dr. Weiss created, developed and manufactured at least 14 new medical opinions for the
Defendants that did not appear in his 10.1.08 IME report (Ex. 14), were not disclosed bv the
Defendants in their pre-hearing discovery responses (Ex. 12) and therefore were not known by
or available to the Claimant at the time of the 12.19.08 Emergency Hearing.
The Industrial Commission relied on at least 14 of Dr. Weiss' new post-hearing medical
opinions to support its denial of this claim:
1.

It was not possible to determine when the free fragment occurred, but the Claimant's
physical findings do not support the conclusion that his free fragment of disc material
was causing his back pain (R., p. 93,79, L. 7 - p. 94, L. 2)
the Claimant did not
just complain of back pain. The Claimant also complained of left lower extremity
radiculopathy symptoms) (Tr., p. 36, L1. 14-16);

w:

2.

It is difficult to say what is causal in something that everybody has (R., p. 93, 79, LI. 34);

3.

Dr. Weiss did not see any connection between the Claimant's need for back surgery and
his employment (R., p. 94,710, L1. 1-2);

4.

Dr. Weiss was troubled that there was no specific event that could be temporally related
: Dr. Weiss appeared to
to the onset of Claimant's back pain (R., p. 94,710, L1. 3-4) w
be ideologically opposed to the occupational disease theory and seemed to insist that
there be some precipitating accident / event for a claim to be cornpensable) (Dep., p. 18,
L1.6-16;p.24,Ll. 18-25;~.28,Ll.10-ll;andp.51,Ll. 12-15);
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5.

High impact activities can lead to the progression of underlying arthritis, but do not
actually cause the underlying arthritis (R., p. 94,710, L1.4-5);

6-10. Degenerative disc disease may be caused by heredity, age, diet, smoking or obesity (R.,
p. 94,711, L1. 13-14);
11.

Dr. Weiss render [sic] [rendered] a well-reasoned expert opinion which opined that
Claimant's degenerative disc disease and facet arthritis developed over time (R., p. 171,
L1. 9-1 1);

12.

When viewed in context of the entire case, the Commission was persuaded by Dr.
Weiss's observations and opinions that Claimant suffered from preexisting degenerative
disease and facet joint arthropathy (R., p. 173, L1. 19-21);

13.

According to Dr. Weiss, Claimant's multilevel degenerative disc disease and facet
arthritis took place over years and years, and was not something that came on acutely in
November of 2007. Dr. Weiss's Depo. pp. 19,23 (R., p. 174, L1.20-22); and,

14.

The Commission adopted Dr. Weiss's opinion that Claimant's underlying degenerative
joint disease and arthritis were not caused by his work (R., p. 174, L1. 8-9).
On 6.26.09, the Claimant filed his Motion For Correction of Erratum and Motion For

Reconsideration with supporting brief (R., pp. 100-148). On 7.8.09, the Claimant filed a Motion
To Strilce all of Dr. Weiss' new post-hearing medical opinions which did &p
Weiss' 10.1.08 IME report and were

appear in Dr.

properly disclosed by the Defendants in their discovery

responses prior to the 12.19.08 Emergency Hearing (R., pp. 152-159). On 10.14.09, the
Commission denied the Claimant's post-hearing Motions (R., pp. 170-178). The Claimant filed
his Notice of Appeal on 11.24.09 (R., pp. 179-188).

(111)
1.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Did the Industrial Commission err by concluding that the Claimant failed to prove that
his need for L5-S1 microdiskectomy surgery was the result of an occupational disease
arising out of and in the course of his employment when there was no substantial and
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competent evidence before the Commission at the time of the 12.19.08 Emergency
Hearing to support that erroneous finding?
Did the Industrial Commission err by denying the Claimant's Motion to Strike Dr. Weiss'
new post-hearing medical opinions based on I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4) and I.R.C.P. 26(e) because
the Defendants did not make proper pre-hearing disclosure of Dr. Weiss' new posthearing medical opinions?
Did the Industrial Commission err by denying the Claimant's Motion to Strike Dr. Weiss'
new post-hearing medical opinions based on J.R.P. 10(E)(4) because Dr. Weiss' new
post-hearing medical opinions were developed, manufactured or discovered following
hearing and were not known by or available to the claimant at the time of hearing?
Did the Industrial Commission e n by giving greater weight to Dr. Weiss' new posthearing medical opinions when Dr. Weiss admitted under oath that his medical opinions
were not supported by a proper factual foundation?
Did the Industrial Commission err by concluding that repetitive heavy lifting, twisting
and bending activities can speed the progression of an existing lusnbar spine disease but
those same hazards cannot cause the disease without explaining the distinction in a
manner that would allow meaningful appellate review?
Did the Industrial Commission err by relying on Dr. Weiss' speculative opinions that the
Claimant's degenerative disc disease may be caused by heredity, age, diet, smoking or
obesity when there was no substantial or competent evidence in the record to support
those findings?
Was it arbitrary and capricious for the Industrial Commission to depart from its prior
ruling in Floves when the facts in this case were directly on point and should have
produced the same outcome?
Did the Industrial Commission err by misstating the evidence in the record and by
misapplying the "characteristic of and peculiar to" standards of Flores and Muldev to the
facts of this case?
Did the Industrial Commission fail to provide the Claimant with a fair hearing before an
impartial tribunal by not giving Claimant written notice that the Nelson defense would be
a disputed issue to be heard and decided at hearing as required by I.C. 572-713, by
raising the Nelson defense to deny this claim after the Defendants had already waived
that defense and by requiring the Claimant to disprove the Nelson defense as an element
in his case-in-chief?
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10.

Did the Industrial Commission err by finding that the Claimant suffered from a
preexisting condition in his low back when there was no substantial and competent
evidence in the record to support that finding and the Commission had to misapply the
holdings from Nelson and its progeny in order to reach that finding?

11.

Is the Claimant entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to I.C. $72-804
and I.A.R. 41?
(IV) ARGUMENT

(1)

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERRED BY CONCLUDING THAT THE
CLAIMANT FAILED TO PROVE THAT HIS LUMBAR SPINE OCCUPATIONAL
DISEASE WAS CONTRACTED 1 INCURRED IN HIS SAWYER 1 ASSEMBLER JOB
BECAUSE THERE WAS NO SUBSTANTIAL OR COMPETENT EVIDENCE
BEFORE THE COMMISSION AT THE 12.19.08 EMERGENCY HEARING TO
SUPPORT THAT CONCLUSION
There is no dispute in this case that the Claimant's 1.23.08 MRI showed that he suffered

from degenerative disc disease in his low back at the L4-5 and L5-S1 levels (Ex. 9, Bates No.
009001-009002). Likewise, there is no dispute that the Claimant's Sawyer / Assembler job
exposed him to the hazards of repetitive heavy lifting, twisting and bending (R., p. 9 4 , l 11, L.
14 - p. 95, L. 2; p. 96, 114, Ll. 3-4). The critical dispute in this case is over whether the
Claimant's exposure to the hazards of repetitive heavy lifting, twisting and bending caused the
Claimant's lumbar spine degenerative disc disease?
As with industrial accident claims, an occupational disease claimant has the
burden of proving, to a reasonable degree of medical probability, a causal
connection between the condition for which compensation is claimed and
occupational exposure to the substance or conditions which caused the alleged
condition. Langley v. State, Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 126 Idaho 781,
786,890 P.2d 732,737 (1995).
The Industrial Commission had a duty to decide the causation question based on the
evidence that was known by and available to the parties at the time of the 12.19.08 Emergency
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Hearing. J.R.P. 10(G) only allows medical reports that are "existing prior to the time of hearing"
to be admitted into evidence. J.R.P. lO(C)(l) requires the parties to serve the other party with all
hearing exhibits at least 10 days prior to the 12.19.08 hearing. The exclusionary rule of J.R.P.
10(E)(4) prevents both parties from creating, developing or manufacturing new evidence during
a post-hearing deposition that was not known by or available to the parties at the time of hearing.
The only substantial and competent medical causation evidence before the Commission
at the time of the 12.19.08 Emergency Hearing came from the Claimant's attending physicians.
Prior to the hearing, Dr. Frizzell had issued 2 written reports and Dr. Bates had issued 1 written
report

which plainly and unequivocally expressed their convictions that the hazards of the

Claimant's Sawyer / Assembler job caused his non-acute lumbar spine disease (R., pp. 24-25)
(Ex. 8, Bates No. 008039-008042) (Ex. 7, Bates No. 007016-007017). The Commission admitted
these reports from the Claimant's attending physicians into evidence without objection from the
Defendants (Tr., p. 7, L1. 7-8). The Defendants conceded that the opinions expressed by Dr.
Frizzell allowed the Claimant to meet his burden of proof (Def. Resp. Br., p. 13, Ll. 14-15) and
the Commission appeared to agree (R., p. 173, L1. 10-14).
This Court has held that "no special verbal formula is necessary" so long as the physician
"plainly and unequivocally conveys his conviction that events are causally related" StevensMcAtee v. Potlatch Covp., 145 Idaho 325, 334, 179 P.3d 288, 297 (2008). If there was any
reasonable doubt over whether the Claimant's non-acute lumbar spine occupational disease arose

3 .

flxc Commission ncver coxnmcnied on rile opin~onsehpresscd 111 Dr Bate.;' 12 1.08 repon and it is unknown from tlxe record
wllcther the ('an~niiscion rven considered i)r Rates' xxlcdical opinions (Ex 7. Rates No 007016-007017,.
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out of and in the course of his employment, that doubt should have been "resolved in favor of the
employee" Page v. McCain Foods, Inc., 141 Idaho 342,347, 109 P.3d 1084, 1089 (2005) (Page
I). The Court must liberally construe the workers' compensation law "in favor of the employee,

in order to serve the humane purpose for which the law was promulgated" Id. 141 Idaho 342,
345, 109 P.3d 1084, 1087 (2005).
In Jensen v. City of Pocatello, 135 Idaho 406, 409, 18 P.3d 21 1, 214 (2000) this Court
recognized the process of elimination as a valid method to prove causation in worker's
compensation claims. When he gave his recorded statement to the Defendants' investigator on
5.16.08, the Claimant ruled out every non-industrial cause for his lumbar spine degenerative
disease by confirming that he did not participate in any physical activities outside of work that
could have been implicated in the cause of his lumbar spine disease (Ex. 4, Bates No. 004019004021).
The Defendants did not offer any medical opinion evidence to rebut the medical opinions
from the Claimant's attending physicians. The Defendants relied exclusively on the generic

observations set forth in Dr. Weiss' 10.1.08 IME report. However, Dr. Weiss did not answer the
1 medical causation question posed to him by the Defendants in his 10.1.08 IME report and Dr.
Weiss did

address a single element in the PFC for an occupational disease claim in his

10.1.08 IMEreport (Ex. 14, BatesNo. 014009).
Given the record that existed at the time of hearing, it was plain error for the Commission
to find that the Claimant had failed to meet his burden of proof. The Court should reverse that
finding because it was not supported by any substantial and competent evidence in the record at
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the time of the 12.19.08 Emergency Hearing.
(2)

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERRED BY DENYING THE CLAIMANT'S
MOTION TO STRIKE DR. WEISS' NEW POST-HEARING MEDICAL OPINIONS
BASED ON I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4) AND I.R.C.P. 26(e) BECAUSE THE DEFENDANTS DID
NOT MAKE PROPER PRE-HEARING DISCLOSURE OF DR. WEISS' NEW POSTHEARING MEDICAL OPINIONS
After the Claimant received the Industrial Commission's 6.8.09 decision and realized that

the Commission had denied his claim based on the 14 new medical opinions that Dr. Weiss
created, developed or manufactured during his 1.27.09 post-hearing deposition, he filed a Motion
To Strike Dr. Weiss' Undisclosed Medical Opinions based on I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4), I.R.C.P. 26(e)
and this Court's holding in Clark v. Klein, 137 Idaho 154,45 P.3d 8 10 (2002) (R., pp. 152-159),
The pre-hearing expert witness disclosure requirements of I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4) apply to
workers' compensation claims by operation of J.R.P. 7(A) and J.R.P. 7(C). Nevertheless, in spite
of these pre-hearing expert witness disclosure requirements, the Industrial Commission
summarily denied the Claimant's 7.8.09 Motion To Strike without any discussion or analysis of
I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4) or this Court's holding in Clark; supra (R., pp. 176-177).
Whether to exclude undisclosed expert testimony pursuant to I.R.C.P. 26(e)(4) is
committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Viehweg v. Thompson, 103
Idaho 265, 271, 647 P.2d 311, 317 (Ct.App.1982) (citing Matter of Webber's
Estate, 97 Idaho 703, 707-08, 551 P.2d 1339, 1343-44 (1976)). The test for
determining whether a district court abused its discretion is: (1) whether the court
correctly perceived that the issue was one of discretion; (2) whether the court
acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal
standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) whether it
reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Sun Valley Shopping Center Inc. v.
Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991).
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The Commission acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner and abused its discretion
when it denied the Claimant's I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4) Motion to Strike without making any findings of
fact that would allow meaningful appellate review. The Court should reverse the Commission's
conclusory and unsupported denial of the Claimant's Motion To Strike.
(3)

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERRED BY DENYING THE CLAIMANT'S
MOTION TO STRIKE DR. WEISS' NEW POST-HEARING MEDICAL OPINIONS
BASED ON J.R.P. lO(EX4) BECAUSE DR. WEISS' NEW POST-HEARING
MEDICAL OPINIONS WERE DEVELOPED, MANUFACTURED OR DISCOVERED
FOLLOWING HEARING AND WERE NOT KNOWN BY OR AVAILABLE TO THE
CLAIMANT AT THE TIME OF HEARING
The Commission listed 5 grounds in support of its decision to deny the Claimant's J.R.P.

10(E)(4) Motion To Strike:
1.
2.
3.
4.

5.

The Claimant's age, diet, smoking status and weight were all facts known by or
available to the Claimant at the time of hearing (R., p. 176, L1. 11-12);
"Defendants disclosed Dr. Weiss as an expert and his report was developed on
October 1,2008" (R., p. 176, L1. 16-17);
The "purpose behind the post-hearing physician deposition is to allow parties the
ability to further flesh out the details behind that which is stated in a report" (R., p.
176, L1. 18-20);
Dr. Weiss' post-hearing "opinions and explanations expressed were based on
evidence admitted prior to or at hearing" (R., p. 176, L. 22- p.177, L. 1); and,
The explanations in the deposition do not involve new medical causation
opinions. Therefore, Claimant's motion to strike is DENIED (R., p. 177, L1. 13).

Ground 1:

The Claimant's age. diet. smoking status and weight were known facts.

The Commission misapplied the exelusionarv rule of J.R.P. 10(E)(4) because it treated
the pre-hearing disclosure of known facts (like the Claimant's age, diet, smoking status and
weight) as the same thing as the post-hearing surprise disclosure of new unknown medical

opinions that were created, developed or manufactured for the first time during a post-hearing
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deposition of an IME medical expert. If the Commission's interpretation were correct, the
Defendants could refuse to make pre-hearing disclosure of their medical experts' opinions and
merely disclose a set of known facts. The Claimant would be required to sort through the
disclosed facts and speculate about every conceivable new surprise medical opinion the
Defendants' medical experts might formulate during their post-hearing depositions based on
each disclosed fact.
The Commission's reading of J.R.P. 10(E)(4) would allow the Defendants' medical
experts to formulate an unlimited number of new medical opinions after the hearing and then
surprise the Claimant with them by making their first disclosure during a post-hearing
deposition. This misapplication of J.R.P. 10(E)(4) deprives the Claimant of his fundamental right
to effectively prepare for cross examination of the Defendants' medical experts and deprives the
Claimant of his fundamental right to obtain rebuttal opinion from his attending physicians &
to the hearing.
-

These are the very evils that the exclusiouaw rule of J.R.P. 10(E)(4) was

presumably designed to prevent.
When the record is left open after a hearing pursuant to J.R.P. 10(E)(l), there is always
the very real and substantial risk that one of the litigants will engage in abusive litigation
practices and surprise his opponent with new post-hearing expert witness opinions that have
never been disclosed prior to the hearing. To prevent the unfair advantage gained by surprise
post-hearing disclosures of new evidence, the Court should strictly construe the mandatory
exclusionary rule set forth in J.R.P. 10(E)(4) and exclude all of Dr. Weiss' new post-hearing
medical opinions.
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Ground 2:

Dr. Weiss and his 10.1.08 IME revort were disclosed vre-hearing.

This is anon sequitur. The Claimant did not move to strike all of Dr. Weiss' 14 new and /
or different post-hearing medical causation opinions because Dr. Weiss and his report were not
disclosed prior to hearing.

Ground 3:

The vurvose of oost-hearing devositions is to allow exverts can flesh out the
details behind the opinions in their reports.

This interpretation of J.R.P. 10(E)(4) is correct because it limits the scope of the medical
expert's post-hearing deposition testimony to a discussion of the "details behind that which is
stated in a report" (i.e., a report that has been properly disclosed prior to the hearing). By its
own logic, the Commission should have excluded all post-hearing deposition testimony from Dr.
Weiss that went beyond a discussion of the 3 generic observations made in his 10.1.08 IME
report (Ex. 14, Bates No. 014009) (See Statement of Facts, supra, at p. 12).

Ground 4:

Dr. Weiss' vost-hearing "ovinions and exvlanations exvressed were based on
evidence admitted vrior to or at hearincr".

Again, the pre-hearing disclosure of a known and admissible fact is not the same thing as
the surprise post-hearing disclosure of a previously unknown and undisclosed medical opinion.
Furthermore, the Commission did not identify which of Dr. Weiss' 14 new "opinions" and
"explanations" were based on "evidence admitted prior to or at hearing" and the Commission did
not identify the alleged admissible evidence that supported each opinion (R., pp. 176, L. 22 - p.
177, L.l). The Commission's conclusory finding does not permit effective appellate review.

Ground 5:

The exvlanations in the devosition do not involve new medical causation
opinions.
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The Commission inexplicably found that Dr. Weiss' new post-hearing opinions were not
opinions but rather mere "explanations" of his prior medical causation opinions (R., p. 177, L1.
1-3). The Commission incorrectly assumed the existence of pre-hearing medical causation
opinions which required further "explanation" when the record reflects that Dr. Weiss did
express any pre-hearing medical causation opinions (Ex. 14, Bates No. 014009). The
Commission based its denial on Dr. Weiss' surprise new post-hearing medical causation
opinions:
The 2008 MRI coupled with Dr. Weiss's opinion support the Commission's
finding that Claimant suffered from preexisting degenerative disease that was not
caused by his work for Employer (R., p. 174, L1. 3-5) (emphasis supplied).
The Commission adopted Dr. Weiss's opinion that Claimant's underlying
degenerative joint disease and arthritis were not caused by his work (R., p. 174,
L1.7-9) (emphasis supplied).
According to Dr. Weiss, Claimant's multilevel degenerative disc disease and facet
arthritis took place over years and years, and was not something that came on
acutely in November of 2007 (R., p. 174, LI. 18-20) (emphasis supplied).
The Industrial Commission's finding that Dr. Weiss did not issue any "new" medical
causation opinions during his post-hearing deposition is directly contradicted by the evidence in
the record and should be reversed:
In our view, this finding directly conflicts with the evidence that was before the
commission, and is not justified by our prior case law. This Court will overturn
the Commission's findings of fact when such' findings are unsupported by
substantial competent evidence. Nelson v. Ponsness- Warren Idgas Enter., 126
Idaho 129, 131,879 P.2d 592,594 (1994).
In summary, the Court should reverse the Commission's denial of the Claimant's Motion
To Strike and exclude all of Dr. Weiss' new surprise post-hearing medical opinions that were g&
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properly disclosed prior to hearing and were

known by or available to the Claimant at the

time of hearing pursuant to I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4), I.R.C.P. 26(e), this Court's holding in Clark,
supra, and the exclusionarv rule of J.R.P. 10(E)(4).
(4)

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERRED BY GIVING GREATER WEIGHT TO
DR. WEISS' NEW POST-HEARING MEDICAL OPINIONS BECAUSE DR. WEISS
ADMITTED UNDER OATH THAT HIS OPINIONS WERE NOT SUPPORTED BY A
PROPER FACTUAL FOUNDATION
This Court has held that expert opinion which is not supported by a proper factual

foundation is speculative and cannot be considered substantial and competent evidence that a
reasonable mind would accept to support a conclusion (See Bromley v. Garey, 132 Idaho 807,
81 1, 979 P.2d 1165, 1169 (1999); J-U-B Engineers v. Security Ins., 146 Idaho 31 1, 316, 193
P.3d 858, 863 (2008); and Politte v. Idaho Department of Transportation and State Insurance
Fund, 126 Idaho 270,271,882 P.2d 437,438 (1994)).
Dr. Weiss admitted under oath during his 1.27.09 post-hearing deposition that he did p&
review the Claimant's written job description before conducting his 10.1.08 IME examination
(Dep., p. 34, Ll. 15-22), he did not ask the Claimant a single question about his work activities
during the 10.1.08 IME examination (Dep., p. 46, L. 25 - p. 47, L. 3), and he did p& review the
Claimant's hearing testimony describing his work activities before he gave his post-hearing
medical opinions (Dep., p. 34, Ll. 6-14).
This Court found that the Industrial Commission caused the Claimant to suffer a
miscarriage of justice when it placed great weight on the medical stability opinion of a physician
who admitted the he did not even examine the patient before rendering his stability opinion (See
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Page 11, 145 Idaho 302, 306, 179 P.3d 265, 269 (2008)). The same logic applies here.

Dr.

Weiss admitted that he knew nothing about the specific hazards of the Claimant's job.
The Claimant asked the Commission to reject all of Dr. Weiss' medical opinions in his
Post-Hearing Reply Brief because they were not supported by a proper factual foundation.
However, for some inexplicable reason, the Commission completely ignored the Claimant's lack
of foundation arguments and then misstated the record when it erroneously found that Dr. Weiss
had reviewed the Claimant's written job description prior to conducting his 10.1.08 IME
examination even though that erroneous finding was directly contradicted by Dr. Weiss' sworn
deposition admissions (R., p. 93,79, L. 1) (Dep. P. 34, L1. 15-22).
The Claimant filed a Motion For Reconsideration and asked the Commission to amend 79
of its 6.8.09 decision to accurately reflect that Dr. Weiss had admitted that he had not reviewed
the Claimant's written job description (R., p. 104, 78(a)(2)). However, for some inexplicable
reason, the Commission refused to correct this misstatement of the evidence (R., pp. 170-178)
and continued to place greater weight on Dr. Weiss' unsupported opinions (R., p. 175, L1. 1819). This Court should reverse the Commission's decision because Dr. Weiss admitted that his
opinions were not supported by a proper factual foundation.
(5)

THE INDUS'l RIAL COhlMISSION FRRED BY CONCLUDING THAT REPETI'I IVE
IJEAVY LIFTING, TWISTING AND BENDING ACTIVITIES CAN SPEED 7H1:
PROGRESSION OF AN EXISTING LUMBAR SPINE IIISEASE BUT THOSE SAME
HAZARDS CANNOT CAUSE TIIE DISEASE iirITHOU?' EXPLAINING THAT
DISTINCTION IN A MANNER THAT WOULD ALLOW MEANINGFUL
APPELLATE REVIEW
The Commission conceded that "[ilt would be reasonable to conclude that Claimant's
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heavy / repetitive work activities (with which Defendants do not disagree) may have speeded the
progression of his underlying disease" (R., p. 94, 111, L. 15-p. 95, L. 1). However, after making
that concession, the Commission refused to take the next logical step and find that the Claimant's
heavy / repetitive work activities were actually "implicated in causing Claimant's disease" (R., p.

The Commission created a causation paradox. If exposure to the hazards of repetitive
heavy lifting, twisting and bending, can speed the progression of an existing lumbar spine
degenerative disc disease, then why can't exposure to those same hazards be an original cause of
the disease? The Commission never explained this distinction in a manner that would allow
meaningful appellate review. A hyper-technical distinction like this without any explanation is
not a proper basis to deny a claim:
However, all courts are agreed that there should be accorded to the Workmens'
Compensation Act a broad and liberal construction, that doubtful cases should be
resolved in favor of compensation, and that the humane purposes which these acts
seek to serve leave no room for narrow technical construction. Haldiman v.
American Fine Foods, 117 Idaho 955,957,793 P.2d 187, 189 (1990).
The Court should reverse the Industrial Commission's unexplained finding that exposure
to the hazards of Claimant's job could speed the progression but not cause his spine disease.

(6)

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERRED BY ADOPTING DR. WEISS'
SPECULATIVE OPINION THAT CLAIMANT'S DEGENERATIVE DISC DISEASE
MAY BE CAUSED BY HEREDITY. AGE. DIET, SMOKING OR OBESITY WHEN
THERE WAS NO SUBSTANTIAL OR COMPETENT EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD
TO SUPPORT THAT FINDING
Although IME physician Weiss testified during his 1.27.09 post-hearing deposition that

the hazards of the Claimant's Sawyer 1 Assembler job did
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disc disease (Dep., p. 30, L1. 21-22), Dr. Weiss failed to offer a plausible alternative explanation
for the Claimant's degenerative disc disease.
According to Dr. Weiss, degenerative disc disease may be caused by many factors
including heredity, aging, diet, smoking, and obesity (R., p. 94,711, L1. 13-14).
Dr. Weiss's observation that degenerative disc disease "may be caused by many factors"
is nothing more than a speculative listing of mere possibilities:
Expert opinion that merely suggests possibilities would only invite conjecture and
may be properly excluded. Elce v. State, 110 Idaho 361, 716 P.2d 505 (1986).
Brornley, supra, 132 Idaho 807,8 11,979 P.2d 1165, 1169 (1 999).
The Claimant asked the Commission to reconsider its reliance on Dr. Weiss' list of
speculative possibilities (R., pp. 129-130).

However, for some inexplicable reason, the

Commission refused to correct this erroneous finding in its Order On Reconsideration and
Pending Motions (R., pp. 170-178). Thecourt should reverse the Commission's erroneous
finding that heredity, age, diet, smoking, or obesity played any role in the onset or development of
the Claimant's lumbar spine degenerative disc disease because there was no evidence in the
record to support that finding.
(7)

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S DEPARTURE FROM ITS PRIOR HOLDING IN
FLORES WAS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE IN
THIS CASE WAS DIRECTLY ON POINT AND SHOULD HAVE PRODUCED THE
SAME OUTCOME
The Commission must administer the Act and apply the law in a consistent manner which

is not arbitrary and capricious.
If, however, the IPUC decides a case in a manner contrary to prior IPUC rulings
the Court will consider whether the IPUC has adequately explained the departure
from prior rulings so that a reviewing court can determine that the decisions are
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not arbitrary and capricious. Rosebud Enterprises, Inc. v. Idaho Public Utilities
Commission, 128 Idaho 609,618,917 P.2d 766,775 (1996).

*****

"[Tlhe rule of stare decisis dictates that we follow [controlling precedent], unless
it is manifestly wrong, unless it has proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or
unless overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and
remedy continued injustice." Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72,
77, 803 P.2d 978, 983 (1990). Reyes v. Kit Mfg.Co., 131 Idaho 239, 240, 953
P.2d 989,990 (1998).
Approximately 6 months before the 12.19.08 Emergency Hearing in this case, the
Industrial Commission decided the closely analogous lumbar spine non-acute occupational
disease case of Flores v. Boise Cascade, 2008 IIC 0420 (2008)~.The Claimant in Flores was a
machine operator whose job exposed him to the hazards of repetitive lifting, twisting and
bending. As the result of his exposure to those hazards, the Claimant developed a lumbar spine
occupational disease at L4-5 which included a left-sided disc herniation with extruded fragment
that was compressing a nerve. The Claimant's degenerative disc disease was & caused by a
specific accident.
The Claimant in this case was also a machine operator whose job exposed him to the
hazards of repetitive heavy lifting, twisting and bending. As the result of his exposure to those
hazards, the Claimant in this case developed a lumbar spine occupational disease at L5-S1 which
included a left-sided disc herniation with extruded fragment that was compressing a nerve. Just

For a detailed discussion of the remarkable similarities between the facts of this case and Flores.. vlease
see vv.
.
. . 3-12 of
('lsimsoi's Post-llcaring Opening Brief; p. 6 and p. 9 of Claimant's Post-Hexing Kupl) Ilricf and pp. 6-8 and pp. 27-29 of
Claimdni's l l r ~ e i i nS u ~ o o nof Muiiun For Correction oiErrstum 2nd hlurion For Rec~~nsidenrtiun
of June 8. 2009 Dccisidll I R .
pp. 124-126and 145-12).
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like the Claimant in Flores, the Claimant's degenerative disc disease was

not caused by

a

specific accident.
The Employer in Floves did got- dispute that the Claimant's job exposed him to the
hazards of repetitive lifting, bending and twisting. The Employer in this case did got- dispute the
Claimant's written job description or the Claimant's sworn hearing testimony which described
the Claimant's exposure to the hazards of repetitive heavy lifting, twisting and bending. The
Commission found that the Claimant's Sawyer / Assembler job exposed him to the hazards of
repetitive lifting, twisting and bending (R. , p. 94,111, L1. 14-p. 95, L. 2 and p. 96,714, Ll. 3-4).
In Floves, the Commission adopted the consensus of medical opinion and found that a
causal relationship existed between the Claimant's exposure to the hazards of repetitive lifting,
twisting and bending and the Claimant's degenerative disc disease with L4-5 disc herniation:
The consensus of medical opinion is that the bending, lifting, and twisting
activities of Claimant's work were implicated in causing his degenerative disc
disease and disc herniation. Defendants do not dispute that Claimant's job
required frequent bending, lifting and twisting ... Flores, supra, at 747 on p. 19.
I think on a more probable than not basis his current symptoms and his disc
herniation at L4-5 on the left are related to his work in that he has to do repetitive
bending, lifting and twisting primarily on the left. Although this gentleman does
not have a specific traumatic episode, hip and fall, or a classic identifying injury I
think this represents a repetitive injury to his low back. Id at 120 on p. 9.
Claimant's work as the slitter operator probably contributed the most to
Claimant's second lumbar herniation, and the continuous lifting and twisting that
this job required was not comparable to manual labor work in general. Id. at 732
on p. 13.
Dr. Frizzell issued 2 written reports in this case which plainly and unequivocally
expressed his conviction that the Claimant's job hazards of repetitive heavy lifting, twisting and
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bending caused his degenerative disc disease. Ironically, Dr. Frizzell was the Defendants' IME
physician in Flores. The Commission adopted Dr. Frizzell's opinions in Flores and awarded
benefits to the Claimant, but rejected virtually the same medical causation opinions from Dr.
Frizzell in this case even though Dr. Frizzell's opinions in both cases were based on the Claimant
being exposed to exactly the same hazards of repetitive lifting, twisting and bending.
When the same medical causation opinions from the same neurological surgeon based on
exposure to exactly the same hazards produce exactly opposite results in closely analogous
cases, the Industrial Commission has abandoned the principle of stare decisis. If the Flores'
Claimant was deemed eligible for benefits under an occupational disease theory based on his
exposure to the hazards of repetitive heavy lifting, twisting and bending, the Claimant in this
case should likewise be deemed eligible for benefits based on his exposure to exactly the same
hazards. The Commission should reach the same result when it applies the same legal standards
to closely analogous facts.
The causal relationship in this case is stronger than Flores because the Claimant in this
case never suffered a prior disc herniation at L5-S1 and never underwent a prior back surgery at
any level in his lumbar spine. Whereas, the Claimant in Flores had already suffered a prior disc
herniation at L4-5, had already undergone prior disc repair surgery at L4-5 and testified at
hearing that his prior L4-5 disc herniation was caused by exposure to the hazards of his job.

Flores, supra, at 113 on page 7.
The Commission explained its departure from its prior holding in Flores with this
rationale:
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Although, Flores bears some similarity to the instant matter, that case was
decided on its own particular facts, and on those facts, the Commission was
persuaded that Claimant's low back injury [sic] [occupational disease] was, in
fact, causally related to the demands of his employment. The Referee does not
find that the evidence before him in this matter supports the same conclusion.
(R., p. 95,712, L1. 3-7) (emphasis supplied).
The Referee in this case did

not cite "the

evidence before him in this matter" which

convinced the Commission that it must depart from its prior ruling in Flores. This type of
conclusory fact finding does not permit effective appellate review. The Court should reverse the
Commission's arbitrary decision to depart from its prior holding in Flores, liberally construe the
worker's compensation Act in favor of the Claimant, apply the Flores' holding to the closely
analogous facts and identical medical causation opinions in this case and find that the Claimant's
lumbar spine occupational disease was caused by his exposure to the same hazards that the

Flores ' Claimant was exposed to.
(8)

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERRED BY MISSTATING THE EVIDENCE IN
THE RECORD AND BY NOT APPLYING THE "CHARACTERISTIC OF AND
PECULIAR T O STANDARDS OF FLORES AND MULDER TO THE FACTS OF
THIS CASE
When addressing the "characteristic of and peculiar to" issue, the Commission attempted

to distinguish this case from Flores by making 2 erroneous findings which are directly
contradicted by the evidence in the record:

H s , no particular machine, or constant repetitive activitv is implicated in
causing Claimant's disease even if it be assumed that Claimant's condition is
causally related to his employment. (R., p. 96,714, L1.4-6) (emphasis supplied).
The Commission's finding that the Claimant did not work with a particular machine is
clearly erroneous and should be reversed by this Court because the uncontroverted facts in the
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Claimant's written job description and the Claimant's uncontroverted hearing testimony proved
that the Claimant performed repetitive heavy lifting, twisting and bending activities in awkward
positions in a confined space while operating and 1 or working with a beam saw machine, a
forklift, a unit 1 pallet and a production cart (Ex. 3) (Tr., p. 22, L. 8 - p.36, L. 6).
The Commission's erroneous finding that the Claimant did not engage in constant or
repetitive activities should also be reversed because the uncontroverted evidence in the
Claimant's written job description proved that the Claimant was required to perform the activities
of heavy lifting, twisting and bending repeatedly at the veryfastpace of the production cycle:
As part of the production cycle, I am required to perform these physical
movements [heavy lifting, twisting and bending] repeatedly at a very fast
pace (i.e., as fast as the saw will cut the product and as fast as I can move
my body while lifting and carrying these heavy sheets of laminate) (R., p.
14,74) (Ex. 3, Bates No. 003001) (emphasis supplied).
The Commission found in Flores that it was the "constant repetition of these three
activities for long periods of time that set Claimant's work apart from the 'general run' of labor
jobs and distinguish it from the cases cited by the Defendants in their brief." Flores, supra, at
749, pp. 20-21. The Commission also found in Flores that "[ilt is not Claimant's level of exertion
that distinguishes his work from the general run of labor jobs, it is the constant repetition." Id.
(emphasis supplied).
There is no practical difference between the Claimant in Flores being required to engage
in the "constant repetition" of the 3 activities of lifting, twisting and bending and the Claimant
in this case being required to engage in the same activities "repeatedly at a very fast pace".
From a functional standpoint, the phrases "constant repetition" and "repeatedly at a very fast
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pace" mean the same thing. The Claimant in this case should not be deprived of the sure and
certain relief promised to him by Idaho Code 572-201 based on such hyper-technical and illusory
distinctions.
Absent a compelling reason to deviate from its prior ruling in Flores, the principle of
stare decisis requires the Industrial Commission to apply the same law to the same predicate
facts and reach the same conclusion. If the constant repetition of lifting, twisting and bending
distinguished the Claimant's job in Flores from the general run of occupations, then the
performance of these same 3 activities "repeatedly at a very fast pace" should likewise
distinguish this Claimant's job from the general run of occupations.
This Court has defined the "characteristic of and peculiar to" standard with the following
language:
The phrase, "peculiar to the occupation," is not here used in the sense that
the disease must be one which originates exclusively from the particular
kind of employment in which the employee is engaged, but rather in the
sense that the conditions of that employment must result in a hazard which
distinguishes it in character from the general run of occupations. 99 Idaho
at 323, 581 P.2d at 781, overruled on other grounds, DeMain v. Bruce
McLaughlin Logging, 132 Idaho 782, 979 P.2d 655 (1999) (emphasis in
original). Mulder v. Liberty Northwest Ins. Co., 135 Idaho 52, 55, 14 P.3d
372, 375 (2000) ...
Moreover, the vast number of occupations which may require one or more
of these activities likely do not require all of them. Id. at 135 Idaho 55, 14
P.3d 375.
The Commission found that the Claimant's Sawyer / Assembler job was not
distinguishable from the general run of occupations with the following unsupported conclusion:
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The evidence in the record does not support a finding that Claimant's job
constitutes a risk of injury [sic] [exposure to hazard] that is distinguishable from
the general run of blue collar work (R., p. 175, L1. 14-15).

Mulder does not require the Claimant to prove that his job "constitutes a risk of injury
that is distinguishable from the general run of blue collar work".

This is a non-acute

occupational disease claim. Occupational disease claims do not require proof of a risk of injury.
Occupational disease claims require proof of exposure to a hazard. The Claimant proved such
exposure. The Court should reverse the Commission's finding that the Claimant's job was not
distinguishable from the general run of occupations because the Commission did not find that the

"vast number" of blue collar jobs require the blue collar worker to perform "all oj" the
particular activities of the Claimant's Sawyer / Assembler job as required by Mulder (See Ex. 3).

(9)

?'FIE IYDL'S'I'IUAI. COMMlSSlON Fr\ll.ED '1'0 PROVIDE 'I'HE CLAIhlAN'I' Wl'fH
A FAIR I-IEARING BEFORE AN IMPARTIAI. TRIBIJNAI. BY NO?' GIVING
CLAIMr\N'I' WIU'I"1'EN NO'I'ICE 'I'HAT 'I'HIS .VLXSO.V DEFENSE WOCJ1.D BE A
DISPlJTED ISSUE TO BE IIEARD AND DECIDED A?' HEARING, BY IL\ISlNG
THE NELSON DEFENSE TO DENY THIS CLAIM AFTER THE DEFENDANTS HAD
ALREADY WAIVED 'I'tIA'I' DEtfi,NSI: ANT) DY KEOIJIKING THE CLAIMANT TO
DISPROVE 'I'HE .Yl<LSO.V l>El.'ESSE AS AN EI.EMENT IN HIS CASE-IN-CIIIEF
The Defendants did

not

raise the Nelson defense in their Answer (R., pp. 8-9). The

Defendants did not list the Nelson defense in their Objection To Request For Emergency Hearing

(R., pp. 72-74). The Commission did not list the Nelson defense in its Order Granting Motion For
Emergency Hearing (R., pp. 78-79). Idaho Code $72-713 requires the Industrial Commission to
provide the parties with written notice of the disputed issues that are going to be heard and
decided at hearing in order to prevent surprise and unfairness:
We are also obligated to give the parties at least 10 days written notice of the
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issues to be heard, in order to prevent surprise and unfairness. See, Idaho Code 9
72-713. Poljarevic v. Independent Food Corporation and Liberty Northwest
Insurance Corporation, I.C. No. 2006-5 10910 (Filed: 1.13.10) (Accuscan cite not
available).
The Commission acknowledged that Nelson was not a noticed issue in this case (R., p. 175,
L. 2). Failure to list Nelson as a disputed issue violated the Claimant's due process rights:
"[Aln administrative tribunal may not raise issues without first serving the
affected party with fair notice and providing him with a full opportunity to meet
the issue." White v. Idaho Forest Indus., 98 Idaho 784, 786, 572 P.2d 887, 889
(1977). Notice informing the parties of a hearing on "all issues considered by the
Appeals Examiner" satisfies due process requirements. McGee v. J.D. Lumber
Co., 135 Idaho 328,333, 17 P.3d 272,277 (2000).
The Defendants had the affirmative duty to raise and prove the Nelson defense.
Rather, we agree with the Commission in its Order on Reconsideration that
Section 72-208(1) is in the nature of an affirmative defense, which if raised by the
employer, must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence by the employer.
Seamans v. Maaco Auto Painting & Body WorkF, 128 Idaho 747, 752, 918 P.2d
1192, 1197 (1996).
When the Referee asked the Defendants if they were going to raise the Nelson defense at
the beginning of the 12.19.08 hearing, the Defendants waived it (Tr., p. 4, L. 17 - p. 5, L. 1).
After the Defendants waived the Nelson defense, the Commission crossed the line into advocacy
and raised Nelson to deny this claim; i.e., "Nelson and its progeny preclude recovery as there is no
accident here" (R., p. 95, 111, L1. 1-2). The Commission attempted to justify its advocacy for the
Defendants with the following rationale:
The Nelson defense was not a noticed issue but whether Claimant incurred an
occupational disease was a noticed issue. The Supreme Court's ruling in Nelson is
not an optional law that the Commission can ignore if the parties so request.
Nelson deals with the threshold cornpensability of an occupational disease (R., p.
175, Ll. 2-5) (emphasis supplied).
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The Commission misapplied the law when it held that this Court's holding in Nelson
created a new "threshold" element of "compensability" in the Claimant's PFC for a compensable
occupational disease claim. The elements in the Claimant's PFC for an occupational disease claim
are defined by statute [See I.C. 572-102 (22) (a), (b) and (c); I.C. 572-437; Idaho Code 572-438
and I.C. 972-4391. These Code provisions do not place the burden on the Claimant to dziprove
the Nelson defense as an element in his case in chief. This Court has never defined the elements
in the Claimant's PFC to include an affirmative duty to disprove the Nelson defense. Langley,

supra, 126 Idaho 781, 890 P.2d 732 (1995). The Court should reverse the Commission's unfair
denial of this claim based on its misapplication of the Nelson defense.
(10)

THE INL)[JSfRIAI. C0XI.MISSION MADE I<lU1ONEOL'SFINI>INCiSOF FACT l\Nl>
\llSAPPI.lED 'I'IIT< LAW lK OI1DI:'R TO FIND 'I'IIAI' THE CLAILIANT SUFFERED
FROILI A PR1:EXISTlNG CONDITION IN HIS LOW BACK THAT DID NOT EXIST
The Commission stated that the medical causation question was at the heart of this case

(R., p. 173, L. 17). The Commission ruled against the Claimant on the causation question based
on its erroneous finding that the Claimant suffered from a "preexisting condition" in his low
back. To support that finding, the Commission cited the following evidence:
(1)

The Claimant complained to "another employer" ..."p rior to the
commencement of his employment with Joslin" that he hoped to get out of
the drywall business because it was causing him low back pain; and,

(2)

The Claimant visited a chiropractor twice in December of 2005
complaining of low back pain that asose without accident or injury while
the Claimant was at home on a Sunday and was taken off work for a few
days. (R.,p. 94,711, L1.7-11).
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The analysis below in subsections (A) - (F) will address each mistake of fact and each
misapplication of the law made by the Industrial Commission in order to reach the erroneous
conclusion that the Claimant suffered from a "preexisting condition" in his low back.
(A)

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION MISSTATED THE EVIDENCE IN THE E C O R D
AND BASED ITS KEY PREEXISTING CONDITION FINDING ON A MISOUOTE
OF A HEARSAY STATEMENT FROM A WITNESS WHO DID NOT TESTIFY AT
HEARING
Exhibit 2 consists of 2 written hearsay statements from the Claimant's former supervisor

at Joslin, Brian Leisten. Mr. Leisten did not testify at the 12.19.08 Emergency Hearing and
therefore lacked observational credibilitv.
Observational credibility "goes to the demeanor of the appellant on the witness
stand" and it "requires that the Commission actually be present for the hearing" in
order to judge it. Stevens-McAtee v. Potlatch Corp., 145 Idaho 325,330, 179 P.3d
288,293 (2008) .
In his 4.12.08 original statement, Mr. Leisten alleged that the Claimant told Mr. Leisten
"another [prior] employer" as erroneously found by the Commission) during his initial
interview with Joslin that he had experienced soreness in his elbow, shoulder and back (not
"low back pain" as erroneously found by the Commission) and was looking to get into a new
profession (Ex. 2, Bates No. 002001).
In his 5.13.08 follow-up hearsay statement, Mr. Leisten alleged that the Claimant told
Mr. Leistenm
(J "another [prior] employer" as erroneousl~rfound by the Commission) when he
applied for his job at Joslin that the physical demands of sheet rock installation had caused the
Claimant "at times" to "experience soreness in his elbow, shoulder, neck and back" @&

"low

back pain" as erroneously found by the Commission) (Ex. 2, Bates No. 002002).
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The Industrial Commission misquoted Mr. Leisten's hearsay statements in order to find a
preexisting condition in his low back that did not exist. The Claimant asked the Commission to
correct its misquote of Mr. Leisten's statements in 71 1 of his Motion For Correction of Erratum
and Motion For Reconsideration (R., p. 111, I l l ) , but the Commission refused and simply
repeated its prior misquote of Mr. Leisten's statements:
Claimant argues this finding is inaccurate. Claimant was questioned about this
statement and his testimony was that prior work caused pain in his elbow but not
his back. Wearing Transcript, p. 17. Yet, the sentence quoted above is supported
in the record by the statement of Claimant's production supervisor. Claimant's
Exhibit 2. (R., p. 172,73, L1.4-7) (emphasis supplied).
Because the Commission's finding directly conflicts with Mr. Leisten's actual statements
in the record and the Claimant's uncontroverted sworn hearing testimony, it must be reversed.

Nelson, supra, 126 Idaho 129,131,879 P.2d 592,594 (1994).
(B)

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERRED BY TREATING MR. LEISTEN'S
WRITTEN HEARSAY STATEMENTS AS SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT
EVIDENCE BECAUSE HE LACKED SUBSTANTIVE CREDIBILITY
Mr. Leisten lacked substantive credibility because his written hearsay statements were

internally self-contradictory and contradicted by the medical records in evidence:
Substantive credibility, on the other hand, may be judged on the grounds of
numerous inaccuracies or conflicting facts and does not require the presence of
the Commission at the hearing. The Commission's findings regarding substantive
credibility will only be disturbed on appeal if they are not supported by
substantial competent evidence. Id. 145 Idaho 325, 330, 179 P.3d 288, 293
(2008).
Mr. Leisten originally stated in his 4.12.08 hearsay statement that the Claimant had
complained to him of soreness in his elbow, shoulder and back due to sheet rock installation, but

then in his 5.13.08 hearsay statement Mr. Leisten expanded the scope of the Claimant's alleged
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preexisting physical complaints to include neck soreness (Ex. 2). Mr. Leisten originally stated in
his 4.12.08 hearsay statement that the Claimant had received treatment from a chiropractor on
two (2) occasions near the end of 2007 (i.e., after the Claimant went to work for Joslin on
9.13.05), but then Mr. Leisten contradicted himself in his 5.13.08 hearsay statement by alleging
that the Claimant 'Yrequently had his back 'popped' by a chiropractor" ... "well before his

employment at Joslin Millwork" (Ex. 2) (emphasis supplied).
The Claimant gave uncontroverted testimony at the 12.19.08 Emergency Hearing that he

never visited a chiropractorprior to his employment with Joslin (Tr., p. 17, L. 23 - p. 18, L. 1).
Mr. Leisten lacked substantive credibility because his hearsay statements were selfcontradictory, refuted by the Claimant's sworn testimony and inconsistent with the medical
records in evidence which did not show any pre-employment visits to a chiropractor. The Court
should reverse the Commission's key Nelson finding that the Claimant suffered from a
xpreexistihg condition" in his low back based on Mr. Leisten's unreliable hearsay statements.
(C)

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERRED BY FINDING THAT A TRANSITORY
COMPLAINT OF LOW BACK PAIN CONSTITUTED SUBSTANTIAL AND
COMPETENT EVIDENCE THAT THE CLAIMANT SUFFERED FROM THE
PREEXISTING CONDITIONS OF DEGENERATIVE DISC DISEASE,
DEGENERATIVE JOINT DISEASE AND FACET ARTHRITIS
The Commission erroneously found that the Claimant suffered from the preexisting

conditions of underlying arthritis (R., p. 94, 710, L. 5), degenerative disc disease and facet
arthritis (R., p. 94, 71 1, L. 6), and underlying degenerative joint disease and arthritis (R., p. 94,
71 1, L. 12). To support those findings, the Commission relied on the Claimant's 2 trips to a
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chiropractor in December of 2005 when he complained of transitory low back pain without
radiculopathy (R., p. 94,711, L1.7-8) (Ex. 13, Bates No. 013005).
The Commission erred by concluding that transitory low back pain without radiculopathy
in December of 2005 was sufficient to support a finding that the Claimant suffered from
advanced degenerative disk disease. Without positive findings on contemporaneous imaging
studies taken prior to Claimant's employment with Joslin and / or prior to his non-acute disease
becoming symptomatic in November of 2007, the Commission lacked a proper foundation to
conclude that the Claimant suffered from a preexisting condition 5. The Court should reverse this
finding because it is unsubstantiated by contemporaneous medical evidence.
(D)

'TI-I15 TNDUSTIZIAL. COMMISSION ERRED BY FINDING THA'l' THE CLAIMANI'
SUFFERFD FROM PREEXlSTING .4ND LWDFIU.YING DEGENERA'TIVE JOINT
DISEASE AND ARTHRITIS IN HIS LOW BACK WHEN THE RESULT SOFT^
CLAIMANT'S 12.13.05 LUMBAR SPINE X-RAY PROVIDED SUBSTANTIAL AND
COMPETENT EVIDENCE THAT THE CLAIMANT'S LOW BACK WAS
NEGATIVE FOR PATHOLOGY WHEN HE WENT TO WORK FOR JOSLIN

Based on Dr. Weiss' inadmissible post-hearing medical opinions, the Commission found
that the Claimant's alleged preexisting degenerative joint disease and facet arthritis took "place
over years and years, and was [sic] [were] not something that came on acutely in November of
2007" (R., p. 174). If Dr. Weiss' logic were correct, then the Claimant's degenerative joint
disease and facet arthritis would have been present and clearly visible on the Claimant's 12.13.05
lumbar spine X-ray.

See discussion of this Court's requirement of contemporaneous medical evidence to verify a preexisting condition in Argument
10 (F), infa, at pp. 44-47.
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The results of the Claimant's 12.13.05 X-ray prove that the Commission's preexisting
condition finding is erroneous because that X-ray provided the Commission with
contemporaneous scientific medical evidence that the Claimant's low back was completely

"negative for pathology" before he was exposed to the hazards of repetitive heavy lifting,
twisting and bending in his Sawyer I Assembler job in mid-2006. For some inexplicable reason,
the Commission overlooked the significance of the Claimant's X-ray findings with the out-ofcontext statement that "[aln x-ray does not image soft tissue in the same manner as an MRY (R.,
p. 174, L1. 2-3). The Commission's distinction between X-ray technology and MRI technology
is a red herring. The Commission did not find that the Claimant suffered from a preexisting soft
tissue condition that would only show up on MRI. The Commission found that the Claimant
suffered from the preexisting conditions of degenerative joint disease and facet arthritis and
indicated that both of these conditions would take years and years to develop (R. 94,111, L. 12)

(R., p. 174, L1.20-22).
If degenerative joint disease and facet arthritis take years and years to develop, then those
preexisting bony abnormalities would have been noticeable on the Claimant's 12.13.05 lumbar
spine X-ray film. The absence of any evidence of degenerativejoint disease and facet arthritis in
the bony structures of the Claimant's lumbar spine on the date of his 12.13.05 X-ray proves
conclusively that the Claimant did

suffer from those preexisting conditions in his low back

prior to becoming exposed to the hazards of his Sawyer 1 Assembler job in mid-2006.
The Court should reverse Commission's decision to not give any weight to the results of
the Claimant's 12.13.05 X-ray because no reasonable mind would conclude that the Claimant
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suffered from advanced degenerative joint disease and arthritis when his X-ray confirmed that
his back was "completely negative for pathology",
(E)

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION MISAPPLIED THE LAW BY FINDING THAT
LOW BACK PAIN NOT CAUSED BY AN ACCIDENT AND INJURY SATISFIED
THE LEGAL DEFINITION OF A PREEXISTING CONDITION UNDER SUNDOUIST
The Idaho Supreme Court has only recognized 2 categories of preexisting conditions

which can trigger application of the Nelson defense: (1) A preexisting occupational disease that
manifested itself before employment with Defendant employer; and (2) A preexisting injury
caused by a prior accident:
In short, DeMain expanded Nelson to apply not only to pre-existing occupational
diseases, but also to the effects of pre-existing injuries. Id. at 782-83, 979 P.2d at
655-56. Sundquist v. Precision Steel & Gypsum, Inc., 141 Idaho 450, 455, 111
P.3d 135, 140 (2000).
Unlike in DeMain, here the record contains no suggestion Sundquist's pain
resulted from having aggravated a pre-existing injury caused by an accident.
Consequently, the holding in DeMain does not apply to the present facts. Id. 141
Idaho 450,455, 111 P.3d 135,140 (2000).
The Commission did not find in this case that Claimant suffered from a preexisting
occupational disease that had manifested before his employment with Joslin.

The Commission found that Claimant suffers from a preexisting condition or
susceptibility (R.,p. 174, L. 14) (emphasis supplied).
The Commission misapplied the law because its own finding confirmed that the
Claimant's transitory low back pain in December of 2005 was

an "injury caused by an

accident":
Dr. Meissner's records from December 2005 reflect that Claimant's low back
pain arose without accident and was first noted on a Sunday, while at home (R.,
p. 94,711, L1. 8-9) (emphasis supplied).
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The Claimant explained to the Commission that it misapplied the Sundquist definition of
a "preexisting condition" that can trigger the Nelson defense in his Motion For Reconsideration
(R., pp. 134-137), but the Commission completely ignored the Claimant's "preexisting
condition" arguments and failed to offer any rationale which explained why it refused to follow
this Court's definition of a "preexisting condition" (R., pp. 170-178). This Court should reverse
the Commission's "preexisting condition" finding because there is no evidence of any kind in the
record that the Claimant has ever suffered an "injury [to his low back] caused by an accident" as
required by Sundquist.
(F)

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION GISAPPLIED THE LAW UNDER NELSON AND
ITS PROGENY WHEN IT GAVE RETROACTIVE APPLICATION TO THE
RESULTS OF THE CLAIMANT'S 1.23.08 MRI SCAN IN ORDER TO FIND A
PREEXISTING CONDITION
The Commission described the Claimant's MRI findings as "preexisting" and

"underlying"to the Claimant's non-acute lumbar spine occupational disease (R., p. 174, L1. 3-5
and 7-10). There are definitional, foundational and legal flaws with the Commission's analysis of
the Claimant's 1.23.08 MRI results. The first is definitional. Common sense dictates that
degenerative findings from a preexisting condition would look exactly the same on MRI film as
degenerative findings from a non-acute occupational disease. The Commission never defined
this illusory distinction that would make degenerative findings appear differently.
If the Commission entertained any doubt over how it should interpret the Claimant's MRI
findings, the Commission was obligated to give the Claimant the benefit of the doubt:
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If there is doubt surrounding whether the accident in question [or occupational
disease] arose out of and in the course of employment [contracted 1 incurred], the
matter will be resolved in favor of the employee. Page I, supra, at 141 Idaho 342,
347, 109 P.3d 1084, 1089 (2005).
Because the Commission failed to provide any rationale that would allow this Court to
understand how the Commission distinguished between these 2 different types of degenerative
findings on the Claimant's 1.23.08 MRI, the Commission's interpretation of the Claimant's MRI
does not permit meaningful appellate review and should be reversed.
The second problem with the Commission giving retroactive application to the results of
the Claimant's 1.23.08 MRI to create the appearance of a "preexisting" and "underlying"
condition is foundational. Whether a condition is "preexisting" or "underlying" relative to a
later occupational disease is a factual determination that must be supported by substantial and
competent evidence in the record:
The question of when a claimant's medical condition becomes "manifest" and
"pre-existing" relative to later events is a question of fact. Sundquist, supra, at 141
Idaho 450,453,111 P.3d 135, 138 (2005).
The Commission did not define the exact date when the Claimant's alleged "preexisting"
and "underlying" low back degenerative disease came into existence and the Commission did

not define the exact date when the Claimant's non-acute lumbar spine occupational disease first
came into existence. The Court does not have any findings of fact that would allow it to
determine if the Claimant's alleged "preexisting" and "underlying" conditions actually
preexisted the onset date of his non-acute occupational disease because the Commission never
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identified those dates. The Court should reverse the Commission's preexisting condition finding
because it is not supported by a proper factual foundation.
The final error made by the Commission was legal. Since this Court first decided Nelson
in 1994, no Supreme Court decision has ever allowed the Commission to find a preexisting
condition based on the retroactive application of the test results from an imaging study that is not
performed until aftr a new occupational disease has become symptomatic. This Court has
always required that the preexisting condition be diagnosed with or verified with

contemporaneous medical evidence that was developed prior to the new employment
relationship or prior to the date when subsequent occupational disease became symptomatic:
1.

Nelson v. Ponsness-Warren Idgas Enterprises, 126 Idaho 129, 879 P.2d 592 (1994)
[Claimant had a prior medical diagnosis of CTS and a prior surgical recommendation 8
years before she went to work for Defendant employer];

2.

Langley v. Industrial Special Idem. Fund, 126 Idaho 781, 890 P.2d 732 (1995) [Claimant
had a prior industrial accident, a prior injury, a prior diagnosis of torn meniscus, and a
prior surgical recommendation 3 years before he filed his current aggravation claim
against Defendant Employer in 19901;

3.

Reyes v. Kit Mfg. Co., 131 Idal~o239, 953 P.2d 989 (1998) [Claimant had prior bilateral
CTS symptoms in 1980, a prior diagnosis of CTS in 1987 and a prior CTS surgery in
1989 5 years before he went to work for Defendant Employer in 19941;

4.

DeMain v. Bruce McLaughlin Logging, 132 Idaho 782, 979 P.2d 655 (1999) [Claimant
had a prior on-the-job injury to his back in 1976 and missed 3 weeks of work before he
went to work for Defendant employer in 1985. The Commission found that Claimant
suffered from a preexisting degenerative disc disease and a herniated disc before he went
to work for Defendant employer];

5.

Cutsinger v. Spears Manufacturing Company, Inc., 137 Idaho 464, 50 P.3d 479 (2002)
[Claimant had a prior left elbow injury from a prior football accident 1 injury in 8' grade.
Claimant had undergone several prior surgeries on his iefi upper extremity between 1980
and 1990 before the Claimant went to work for Defendant Employer in 19941;
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6.

Koch v. Micron Technology, 136 Idaho 885,42 P.3d 678 (2002) [The Claimant admitted
that she already suffered from pre-existing calcific tendonitis in her right shoulder before
she went to work for Defendant Employer and admitted that her new employment merely
aggravated but did not cause her preexisting condition]; and,

7.

Konvalinka v. Bonneville County, 140 Idaho 477, 95 P.3d 628 (2004) [The Claimant
admitted that she suffered from the preexisting condition of bilateral osteoarthritis at the
base of her thumbs and the Claimant admitted that her current employment merely
aggravated her preexisting condition but did not cause it].
The record before the Commission did not contain any contemporaneous medical

evidence that the Claimant had been diagnosed with degenerativejoint disease, facet arthritis and
L5-S1 disc herniation with extruded fragment before he went to work for Joslin on 9.13.05 or
before his L5-S1 disc herniation became symptomatic and produced left lower extremity
radicular symptoms in November of 2007

6.

This Court has always required such

contemporaneous medical evidence to support a finding of a preexisting condition.
The Cowt should reverse the Commission's new speculative method of proving the
existence of a preexisting condition because the Commission could always give retroactive
application to current test results in order to support the speculative finding of a preexisting
condition and then improperly apply the Nelson defense to deny a cornpensable claim.
(1 1)

THE CLAIMANT IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES UNDER
IDAHO CODE 672-804 AND I.A.R. 41 BECAUSE THE DEFENDANTS DENIED
THIS CLAIM AND REFUSED TO PAY BENEFITS WITHOUT REASONABLE
GROUNDS
The Claimant listed his entitlement to an award of attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code

The Claimant's 12.13.05X-ray provided conclusive evidence that the Claimant did not suffer from any of these preexisting
conditions. See argument 10(D), at pp. 41-43,supra.
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572-804 in his 6.1 1.08 Complaint (R., p. 2) and in his 8.5.08 Motion For Emergency Hearing

(R., p. 11). The Claimant is entitled to an award of attorney's fees because the Defendants
"contested a claim for compensation" ... "without reasonable ground" (See Idaho Code § 72804). Prior to the 12.19.08 Emergency Hearing, the Defendants did not come forward and
present 1 adverse fact or 1 adverse medical opinion that would serve as an affirmative defense to
any element in the PFC for an occupational disease claim. The Defendants attempted to cloak
their bald denial with an after-the-fact IME medical opinion just before hearing in an effort to
make their unsupported denial appear reasonable. However, the Defendants' IME medical
expert did

not

answer the key medical causation question and did

address any of the

elements in the PFC for an occupational disease claim in his 10.1.08 IME report.
The Industrial Commission just recently awarded attorney's fees under Idaho Code $72804 in a closely analogous situation where the Defendants denied a claim for medical benefits
without any expert medical opinion to support their denial and waited until just before the
hearing to obtain expert medical opinion. See Page v. McCain Foods, Inc, 2009 IIC 0424,739,
page 10 (2009).
Even after the Defendants surprised the Claimant with Dr. Weiss' 14 new post-hearing
medical opinions, the Defendants still lacked reasonable grounds to deny this claim because Dr.
Weiss admitted that his medical opinions were not supported by proper factual foundation. When
the Commission relies on unsupported medical opinions, a miscarriage of justice can result.

Page 11, 145 Idaho 302,305-306, 179 P.3d 265,268-269 (2008). The same logic applies to the
Defendants' reliance upon (and the Commission's adoption of) Dr. Weiss' opinions in this case.
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The record before the Commission in this case contained overwhelming evidence that the
Claimant contracted / incurred his lumbar spine occupational disease as the result of his exposure
to the hazards of his Sawyer / Assembler job. The Defendants did not come forward and rebut
the Claimant's evidence with any competent or substantial evidence that would give rise to an
affirmative defense and the Defendants failed to offer any other plausible explanation for the
existence of the Claimant's degenerative disc disease. The Court should award the Claimant
attorney fees and costs for all stages of this claim, including those below, on appeal, and on
remand. See Stevens- McAtee v. Potlatch Corp., 145 Idaho 325,337,179 P.3d 288,300 (2008).

CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse the Industrial Commission's 6.8.09 and 10.14.09 Orders and
Order the Defendants to provide the Claimant with the sure and certain relief promised to him by
the Workers' Compensation Act including, but not limited to:

1.

All reasonable medical benefits required by the Claimant's attending physicians to
treat his non-acute occupational disease and / or needed for a reasonable time after the
manifestation of his disease pursuant to Idaho Code $72-432(1);

2.

All temporary disability / income benefits that the Claimant is entitled to receive
during his period of recovery pursuant to Idaho Code 572-408, 572-409 and 572-419;
and,

3.

All attorney's fees and costs incurred at every stage of this case pursuant to Idaho
Code 572-804 and I.A.R. 41.

Claimant 1Appellant's Opening Brief

Page 49

Respectfully submitted this 9" day of March, 2010.
Ellsworth, Kallas, Talboy & DeFranco, PLLC

-

Attorney For Claimant / Appellant
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